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Abstract
This paper explores the implications of time varying volatility for optimal
monetary policy and the measurement of welfare costs. We show how macro-
economic models with linear and quadratic state dependence in their variance
structure can be used for the analysis of optimal policy within the framework
of an optimal linear regulator problem. We use this framework to study op-
timal monetary policy under ination conditional volatility and nd that the
quadratic component of the variance makes policy more responsive to ina-
tion shocks in the same way that an increase in the welfare weight attached
to ination does, while the linear component reduces the steady state rate of
ination. Empirical results for the period 1979-2010 underline the statistical
signicance of ination-dependent UK macroeconomic volatility. Analysis of
the welfare losses associated with ination and macroeconomic volatility shows
that the conventional homoskedastic model seriously underestimates both the
welfare costs of ination and the potential gains from policy optimization.
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1 Introduction
Since the Second World War, the worlds developed economies have experienced
marked uctuations in macroeconomic volatility. The early post-war years were
relatively stable but volatility rose from decade to decade, reaching a peak in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. It then began to subside in the mid 1980s, remaining
remarkably low until the credit crunch that began in August 2007. Stock and
Watson (2002) refer to the decline in US macroeconomic volatility started from the
mid 1980s as the Great Moderation. Similar declines in volatility occurred over
the same period of time in almost all G7 countries (Bernanke (2004)), and have
been particularly marked in the UK, where Mervyn King dubbed the period 1994-
2003 as the NICEor Non-Inationary Consistent Expansiondecade (King (2003)).
However, economic volatility has risen markedly since the credit crunch of 2007,
provoking the sharpest recession seen in the G7 countries since the Second World
War.
The recognition of time-varying volatility in macroeconomic data has lead econo-
mists to abandon the traditional constant variance (homoskedasticity) assumption
and to develop macroeconomic models in which volatility can uctuate. This litera-
ture has demonstrated that modelling movements in volatility increases the accuracy
of parameter estimates and macroeconomic forecasts. It also provides a framework
for analyzing changes in volatility, asking whether they are for instance driven by
changes in the systematic component of macroeconomic policy or the magnitude
of shocks. Recent examples of this burgeoning literature include Primiceri (2005),
Sims and Zha (2006), Canova, Gambetti, and Pappa (2008), Justiniano and Prim-
iceri (2008) and Benati and Surico (2009) for the US. Benati (2004) and Bianchi,
Mumtaz, and Surico (2009) look at the evidence for the UK and Mumtaz and Surico
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(2011) for a sample of industrialized countries.
This paper attempts to explore theoretically and measure empirically the implica-
tions of time-varying macroeconomic volatility for macroeconomic policy and welfare.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the rst time that this type of exercise has been
conducted. We focus on state dependent volatility, a class of stochastic volatility
models that relates this to the (lagged) value of one or more state variables. This
type of model is extensively used in the literature on the term structure of interest
rates, where the e¤ect of volatility upon risk premia is a vital consideration. We
start with a general framework that allows the variance of the shocks to depend in
both a linear and a quadratic way on state variables reecting ination and the state
of the business cycle. The linear specication is the analogue of the Cox, Ingersoll,
and Ross (1985) square rootvolatility specication of the term structure literature,
while the quadratic specication is the analogue of Dothan (1978) and Courtadon
(1982). We combine these two e¤ects and analyze the implications for welfare and
optimal policy assuming that policy makers care about squared deviations in goal
variables such as ination and the output gap around their target values, as in the
canonical homoskedastic control problem (Lungqvist and Sargent (2004)).
Two general results emerge from this analysis. First, unlike the standard ho-
moskedastic control problem which is certainty equivalent (meaning that the optimal
rule is the same as it would be in the absence of uncertainty) we show that the coef-
cients of the optimal policy rule are a¤ected by the stochastic structure when this
is state dependent. Second, we show how the optimal linear regulator problem for a
state dependent model can be re-parameterized so that standard control techniques
can be employed to quantify optimal policy rules and welfare losses. The rst result
highlights the importance of allowing for time-varying volatility in the design of opti-
mal macroeconomic policy, while the second shows how this can be performed using
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the algorithms and insights provided by existing methodologies.
We then use this framework to examine how the design of optimal monetary
policy and welfare analysis change when macroeconomic volatility depends upon the
rate of ination.1 We show that linear-quadratic ination conditional volatility adds
to the welfare cost of ination, thus altering the conduct of optimal monetary policy.
Specically, we show that this e¤ect makes the optimal monetary policy response to
a rise in ination more aggressive than that implied by a homoskedastic model and
leads to a lower average ination rate. A number of papers, Holland (1995), Fountas,
Karanasos, and Kim (2002) and Caporale and Kontonikas (2009) among others,
have argued that, if policy makers care about economic stability then an increase in
ination should lead to a monetary tightening response to constrain the increase in
macroeconomic volatility. Our theoretical results formalize this conjecture.
We have looked at the signicance of conditional heteroskedasticity using several
econometric methodologies for several di¤erent countries. In this paper we present
the results for the UK using a version Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) model which
we modify to allow the variance structure of the shocks to exhibit linear-quadratic
ination dependence. We focus on the UK country because we nd that ination
conditional volatility is empirically much stronger than for other countries that we
have looked at. The Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) model is chosen because it pro-
vides a simple and e¤ective description of the dynamic evolution of the key variables
describing the macroeconomy and as such is a workhorse for the analysis of monetary
1The relationship between the ination rate and macroeconomic volatility was rst documented
by Okun (1971) and the implications for welfare analysis were rst noted by Friedman in his Nobel
lecture, Friedman (1977). Early theoretical work suggesting that the ination rate a¤ects macroeco-
nomic volatility includes Ball (1992) and Ungar and Zilberfarb (1993). Empirical evidence in support
of this relationship was initially provided by Ball and Cecchetti (1990), Brunner and Hess (1993),
Holland (1995) and Fountas, Karanasos, and Kim (2002) for the US. Evidence for other industri-
alized countries is found in Fountas and Karanasos (2007) and for the UK in Conrad, Karanasos,
and Zeng (2010). The empirical term structure literature also suggests that the volatility of short
term interest rates is state-dependent; see Chen, Karolyi, Longsta¤, and Sanders (1992), Ait-Sahalia
(1996), Stanton (1997) and, for the UK, Nowman (1999). Reecting this literature, we nd that
the ination rate has a very signicant e¤ect on UK macroeconomic volatility.
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policy. See for example, Ozlale (2003), Favero and Rovelli (2003), Dennis (2006) and
Cogley et al (2011).
The maximum likelihood estimates of the model based on UK quarterly time series
for the output gap; ination and nominal interest rate, show that linear-quadratic
dependence provides a much better explanation of the UK data over the period 1979-
2010 than the assumption of constant variance or linear dependence. This result is
consistent with the nding of Sims and Zha (2006) that time-varying volatility models
typically outperform homoscedastic models when estimated over long periods of time.
In particular, the empirical model captures the high level of volatility seen in the UK
until the mid 1980s and the subsequent decline, consistent with the time-varying
macroeconomic volatility literature.
We then ask how recognizing the dependence of volatility upon ination would
have inuenced the design of an optimal monetary policy rule derived from the min-
imization of a quadratic ination targeting loss function consistent with Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003). As in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999),
Sack (2000) and Woodford (2003), we replace the estimated interest rate equation (or
Taylor rule) by the optimal policy rule and study the implied dynamics of the model
under optimal policy. The optimal policy calculations suggest that mis-specication
of the variance structure can lead researchers to seriously understate both the welfare
cost of ination and the potential gains from optimization.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2, supported by Appendices 1
and 2, presents a general analysis of state dependent volatility and its implications
for the optimal conduct of macroeconomic policy. Section 3, supported by Appendix
3, applies this to the study of optimal monetary policy under ination-conditional
volatility and outlines the version of the macroeconomic model of the economy used
here to allow for linear-quadratic ination dependence in the variance structure. Sec-
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tion 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimation results, while section 5 quanties
the coe¢ cients of the optimal policy rule and welfare losses. Section 6 concludes
with a brief summary of the empirical ndings and their relevance for UK monetary
policy, together with an agenda for future research.
2 Optimal macroeconomic control with state dependent volatil-
ity
In this section we explore the general implications of state dependent volatility for
the optimal design of macroeconomic policy. We employ a canonical specication,
which we then specialize in subsequent sections.
2.1 The dynamic structure
We start with a general linear dynamic model. This is expressed in state space form
as:
Xt+1 =Xt +it +Ut+1 (1)
Ut+1 N(0;t+1); (2)
whereXt is an n1 vector of state variables observed by the decision maker describing
the position of the macroeconomy at any time t; it is a policy instrument available
to the decision maker in period t;  an n2 matrix of coe¢ cients;  is an n  1
vector; and Ut is a an n  1 vector of Gaussian error terms, with t+1 denoting a
n2 variance-covariance matrix, discussed further below.
Variables are expressed as deviations from sample mean, so there is no intercept
constant vector in this system. Obviously, the state vector must include the variables
targeted by the policy maker, notably the output gap (gt = sgXt) and the annual
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rate of ination (at = saXt); where sz is a selection vector that picks any variable
or linear combination of variables zt (including gt and at ) from Xt. If the decision
maker is a central bank, the policy instrument it can be either the monetary base,
the exchange rate or the policy interest rate.
A wide range of macro models can be written in the state space form (1). For
example, this describes VAR models such as those used for the measurement of
macroeconomic shocks by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov
(1998); for optimal control exercises by Sack (2000) and Polito and Wickens (2011).
It also encompasses the Rudebusch-Svensson central bank model, which has been
extensively employed for the analysis of US monetary policy (Ozlale (2003), Favero
and Rovelli (2003) and Dennis (2006)) used in the next section. Since the state
vector Xt+1 can also include variables representing private sector expectations, (1) is
consistent with the state space representation of linear rational expectations models,
as in Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Soderlind (1999), Woodford (2003), Lungqvist and
Sargent (2004) and Salemi (2006). Walsh (2010) explores the implications for optimal
monetary policy when the parameters of (1) are derived from Gali and Gertler (2007)
specication of the New Keynesian model.
2.2 The stochastic structure
The optimal control literature has hitherto assumed that volatility is constant over
time. However, the term structure literature departs from this homoskedastic frame-
work by assuming that the error structure exhibits linear-quadratic dependence. The
workhorse is provided by the A1 specication,2 which assumes that there is a single
2The subscript indicates the number of variables or combinations driving volatity, so the ho-
moskedastic model is denoted as A0:
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variable or combination of variables driving volatility:
Ut+1 = 
1
2
t+1Vt+1; (3)
where Vt+1 is a an n1 vector of standard normally independently distributed error
terms and
t+1 =E[Ut+1U
0
t+1jXt] (4)
=0 +1s
0
zXt +2X
0
tSzXt
=0 +1zt +2z
2
t ;
where i; i = 0; 1; 2 are n2 matrices of coe¢ cients.3 This allows the variance of the
stochastic shocks entering (1) and (2) to depend on a single linear combination of
lagged dependent variables (zt) and its square. We can write the squared value of a
variable a¤ecting the variance as z2t = X
0
tSzXt where Sz = szs
0
z. In this paper we
assume that the policy instrument does not a¤ect volatility directly since Xt does
not include it: We use the selection vector s0i to pick out it 1 from Xt : it 1 = s
0
iXt
and i2t 1 = X
0
tSiXt; where Si = sis
0
i.
Equation (4) encompasses a wide range of volatility models. The standard ho-
moskedastic specication (A0) is obtained when 1 = 2 = 0, so that t = 0.
The linear dependence specication, consistent with Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985),
is obtained when 2 = 0. A quadratic dependence specication that relates vari-
ances to the square of a state variable, as proposed by Dothan (1978) and Courtadon
(1982), is obtained when 1 = 0.
Equation (4) shows how the responses of the state variables to shocks depend on
3Appendix 1 reports the restrictions that we use to ensure that this is admissible, i.e. that the
variance structure remains non-negative denite.
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the specication of the variance structure. In a homoskedastic model, these responses
do not depend upon the state variables and are entirely determined by the dynamic
model (1). They are linear in the shocks, symmetric for positive and negative shocks
for example. However, in a conditional volatility model the impulse responses also
depend on the initial values of the variables driving volatility. Moreover, because
changes in the values of the driving variables in one period a¤ect the impact of
subsequent shocks (modelled by the Gaussian vector Vt+1 in (3)), the responses
depend upon the size, sign and duration of the shocks being simulated. These non-
linear e¤ects are not apparent in conventional simulations of one period shocks but
are evident in simulations of longer-lasting shocks (as section 4.3 will demonstrate).
For example, in the linear dependence model (with 2 = 0), the model responses
are amplied by any series of shocks that increases the variable (or combination of
variables) zt driving volatility. A series of negative shocks has the opposite e¤ect,
depressing this variable, attenuating the e¤ect of further negative shocks and making
the responses asymmetric. As explained in appendix 1, this e¤ect implies a lower
bound for the variable driving volatility. The amplication e¤ect is also a feature of
the quadratic dependence specication (with 1 = 0). However, starting with an
initial value of zt = 0 keeps the responses to positive and negative shocks symmetric.
The general model incorporates both amplication and attenuation e¤ects but the
asymmetries in numerical simulations are less marked than in the linear model and
the driving variable is unbounded.
2.3 The conditional volatility control framework
Appendix 2 shows how state dependent volatility a¤ects the determination of an
optimal decision rule within the general framework of the stochastic linear regulator
problem. The remainder of this section (and the appendix) can be skipped by readers
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who are primarily interested in the ination-conditional volatility specication, which
is set out in the next section. However the general intuition is quite straightforward.
When a decision maker has a concave utility or loss function (like a quadratic) de-
ned over deviations of variables like ination and output from bliss values, volatility
in the goal variables reduces expected utility in the same way that volatility of as-
set prices reduces the utility of an investor with a concave utility function. In the
standard stochastic optimal regulator problem volatility is constant and the decision
rule exhibits certainty equivalence: it does not depend in any way upon the degree
of volatility in the system. In that case, volatility just lowers welfare and there is
nothing the decision maker can do about it. If however, macroeconomic volatility is
state dependent and the decision maker can inuence the state of the system, this
should inuence his behavior. The certainty equivalence principle does not hold,
since the coe¢ cients of the optimal policy rule as well as the minimum value of the
loss depend upon the variance structure.
Appendix 2 formalizes this observation and analyses the general implications,
assuming that the preferences of a decision maker are characterized by a canonical
quadratic loss function and that the law of motion of the state variables is described
by the linear-quadratic state space framework set out in equations (1) and (4). The
appendix shows that because the conditional volatility terms in (4) are linear and
quadratic they have an e¤ect which is mathematically equivalent to the linear and
quadratic terms describing the welfare loss. This isomorphism means that we can
re-write any linear-quadratic state dependent volatility control problem as an equiv-
alent homoskedastic problem by a suitable re-parameterization of the targets and
welfare weights. Given a volatility process of the general form (4), we set the linear
(1) and quadratic (2) components to zero and appropriately adjust the target
values and welfare weights in the loss function. Specically, appendix 2 shows that
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the linear dependence component has an e¤ect equivalent to changing the target val-
ues in the welfare function while the quadratic component is equivalent to a change
in the welfare weights given to squared deviations from target. This means that
researchers can draw upon standard optimal control algorithms and insights in solv-
ing heteroskedastic control problems and discussing the results. An illustration is
provided by the model set out in the next section.
3 An ination-conditional volatility model
The adjustments to the welfare parameters in the canonical model of the previous
section depend upon the choice of the state variables conditioning volatility. These
adjustments could make policy either more or less responsive to economic distur-
bances and little can be said without specifying the nature of this dependence. In
this section we provide an example based upon the ination-conditional volatility
model discussed in the introduction and examine its broad qualitative implications
for economic policy.
First we briey describe the specication search that led us to employ this spec-
ication. We started by using the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test to conrm the
signicance of conditional heteroskedasticity in various UK macroeconomic data.
The rst stage of this test is to regress a variable such as the output gap, ination
or interest rate on its lagged values. The second stage takes the squared residuals
from these regressions as a measure of volatility and regresses them on various lagged
indicator variables (and their squares). We began by using the base rate and the
10 year Treasury yield as explanatory variables in these second stage regressions, as
suggested by the term structure literature. These variables performed reasonably
well, but we found that the annual Consumer Expenditure Deator (CED) ination
rate gave a much better explanation, consistent with the hypothesis that macroeco-
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nomic volatility is driven by the underlying ination rate. The output gap was not
signicant either on its own or in combination with other variables. We thus adopted
a single factor volatility structure, driven by the lagged annual (CED) ination rate.
Thus we specify: z =  in equation (4).
In this section, we assume that the central bank uses the policy interest rate (it)
to minimize an intertemporal loss function including as arguments the variation in
the output gap; the variation in the annual ination rate around its target and the
change in the interest rate:
Lt = Et
1X
j=0
t+j
h

 
at+j   
2
+ g2t+j +  (it+j)
2
i
; (5)
where Et is the time t conditional expectations operator;  is the discount factor,
at+j is the annual ination rate, it+j = it+j  it+j 1 is the change in the base rate;
 is the ination target; and the parameters   0;   0 and   0 are weights
given to ination, output gap and instrument stabilization. Rotemberg andWoodford
(1997) and Woodford (2003) show that this quadratic loss function provides a good
approximation to the expected lifetime utility of a representative household derived
from a fully micro-founded macroeconomic model of the economy, in which ination
brings e¢ ciency costs by distorting relative prices.
The policy maker is assumed to choose the intertemporal sequence of policy in-
struments fit+jg1j=0 that minimizes this loss function given the model of the economy
in (1)-(4) and the initial state vector Xt. This minimization problem can be solved
using standard dynamic programming techniques. Because the control problem is
entirely linear-quadratic the solution or value function (which shows the minimum
expected loss in any period t aggregating over current and future periods), can be
written as a linear-quadratic function of the state variables Xt observed by the policy
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maker at the beginning of that period:
J (Xt) = minfit+jg
Lt (6)
= c  2X0tp+X0tPXt; (7)
where p is an n 1 vector of constant coe¢ cients and P an n2 positive semidenite
matrix of coe¢ cients that depend upon the nature of the problem.
The optimal policy is then found from the solution of a recursive Bellman equation
that is obtained by substituting (5) into (6); using J (Xt+1) to represent the minimum
expected value of future losses and then substituting (7):
J (Xt) = min
it
[ (at   )2 + g2t +  (it)2 + Et
 
X0t+1PXt+1   2X0t+1p+ c

]:
Evaluating expectations using the constraints (1) and (4) gives the conditional volatil-
ity problem:
J (Xt) = min
it
8>><>>:
 (at   )2 + g2t +  (it)2 + c+ It
+tr (P1)
a
t + tr (P2) (
a
t )
2
9>>=>>; ; (8)
where:
It = I (Xt; it) = [(it +Xt)
0
P (it +Xt) 2 (it +Xt)0 p+tr (P0)]: (9)
The rst line of (8) shows the Bellman form of the standard homoskedastic control
problem, in which: 1= 2= 0. In this case, the target rate for the variables in Xt
is normally assumed to be in line with the sample mean and  = 0 if the model
is specied in terms of mean-di¤erences. The certainty equivalence principle also
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holds in this case. The last two terms of (8) are non-standard and capture the e¤ect
of the state dependent variance structure on the control problem. Since these are
respectively linear and quadratic in at , they a¤ect the coe¢ cients of the optimal
policy rule. However, we can consolidate these with the ination term in the rst
period loss writing the Bellman equation in the canonical form by setting1= 2= 0
and replacing the welfare parameters ;  and c by ~; ~ and ~c in the rst term of
the loss function (8), where:
~= [+trP2]   (10)
~ = [   tr(P1)=2]=~ (11)
~c= c+ [()2   (~)2]=: (12)
This shows that the quadratic-dependent volatility term trP2 stemming from
2 in (4) has the e¤ect of making policy more aggressive in the sense that it has
exactly the same e¤ect on the optimal policy responses as would an increase in the
welfare weight  due to the macroeconomic costs of inationary price distortions in
the standard problem (Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)). The linear dependence
term 1 has the e¤ect of reducing the e¤ective target rate of ination from 
to: ~ = [   tr(P1)] =~; where tr(P1)  0: Provided that   0 then
~   (since   ~): Thus we see that the e¤ect of linear dependence is to reduce
the e¤ective target and hence the steady state rate of ination in exactly the same
way as a negative structural shift in  would. Finally, the intercept in the value
function shifts from c to ~c, but this does not a¤ect the decision rule.
Transforming (8) using this re-parameterization allows the optimization problem
to be written in the form of a standard Bellman problem:
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J (Xt) = min
it
[~ (at   ~)2 + g2t + i2t + ~c+ I (Xt; it)]: (13)
The solution to (13) can then be obtained using the techniques developed for the
standard homoskedastic problem (for a review, see Lungqvist and Sargent (2004)).
If the parameters of (1) are independent of the policy rule, as for example in the
model developed in the rest of this section, the optimal policy rule is obtained simply
by (13) di¤erentiating w.r.t. it and solving for the optimal policy rate. Using the
notation described in section 2.1 to write i2t as (it   siXt)2 in (13), this procedure
gives:
it =  + Xt (14)
where:  =
0p
+0P
;  =
s0i   0P
+0P
: (15)
Substituting these expressions back into (13) and equating with (7) then allows us
to solve for the parameters using this notation as:
p =  1
2
~~

I  ( +)0 1 sa (16)
P = ~Sa + Sga + Sia
  (s0i   0P)0 (+0P) 1 (s0i 0P) + 0P: (17)
Equation (14) shows that the optimal policy rule is linear in the current state
vector, with (15) determining its intercept and slope coe¢ cients as in the standard
model. The linear and quadratic volatility terms 1 and 2 do a¤ect the policy
rule. They work indirectly through the parameters p and P of the value function
(7), dened in (10), (11), (16) and (17). Inspection of (14) and (15) shows that p and
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hence linear dependence only a¤ects the intercept coe¢ cient in the policy response
function, while quadratic dependence also a¤ects the slope parameters, via its e¤ect
on P.
The observation that the monetary authorities should be more aggressive in re-
sponding to increases in ination, if this increases macroeconomic volatility is for-
malized in equations (10) and (11), but is not new. In his seminal paper, Friedman
(1977) suggests that a burst in ination increases variability of both actual and antic-
ipated ination. A number of authors, for example, Holland (1993), Holland (1995),
Fountas, Karanasos, and Kim (2002), Fountas, Ioannidis, and Karanasos (2004) and
Caporale and Kontonikas (2009), follow Friedman (1977) in suggesting that the as-
sociated rise in macroeconomic volatility is part of the welfare cost of ination and
that taking account of this e¤ect should make the authorities react more aggressively
towards an increase in ination, thus leading to a lower average ination rate.
The next section adapts a standard macro model to quantify empirically the
impact of ination conditional volatility on optimal monetary policy in the UK.
3.1 Modelling the macroeconomy
In this section we specify a simple linear structure for the UK economy that is
potentially heteroskedastic. This based on the semi-structural dynamic model of
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), which represents the behavior of the macroeconomy
in terms of the output gap, ination and the policy interest rate. This type of
model has been extensively used in macro-nance literature on the term structure of
interest rates (Dewachter and Lyrio (2006), Rudebusch and Wu (2008)) and in the
macroeconomic literature on optimal monetary policy (Favero and Rovelli (2003),
Dennis (2006), Cogley, De Paoli, Matthes, Nikolow, and Yates (2011)). We represent
ination (t) by the quarterly percentage change in the CED, averaging this over
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four quarters to get the annual rate (at ).
4 The Bank of Englands base rate is
used to represent the policy instrument (it). Both of these series were supplied by
Datastream. The GDP output gap (gt) is the OECD measure, based on a trend
ltering approach. The estimation sample begins in 1979Q3 following the election
of the Thatcher government in May 1979, which saw a move to a more aggressive
monetary stance and it ends in 2010Q4. Table 1 reports the basic summary statistics
for the data before they were de-meaned for use in subsequent analysis. Hereafter,
gt; t and it refer to deviations from mean values. The ADF and KPSS statistics
suggest that the ination rate and the base rate have a unit root.
3.2 The dynamic structure
The model describes the dynamic evolution of the output gap and the ination rate
according to the structural relationships:
gt = a1gt 1 + a2gt 2 + a3(iat 1   at 1) + ug;t (18)
t = b1t 1 + b2t 2 + b3t 3 + b4t 4 + b5gt 1 + u;t; (19)
where at =
1
4
P3
j=0 t j and i
a
t =
1
4
P3
j=0 it j are the annual ination and interest
rates. The rst equation represents the IS curve, while the second is the Phillips
curve. As the restriction b4 = 1   b1   b2   b3 is imposed, the Phillips curve is
vertical in the long run. The IS equation implies that in the long run the nominal
rate equals the ination rate, i.e. i =  for mean-adjusted data in non-accelerating
ination equilibrium. The error terms ug;t and u;t are conventionally interpreted
as demand and supply shocks respectively. The model is augmented to include an
4This series is used because it is (implicitly) seasonally adjusted. The annual percentage changes
in the CED closely track those in the RPIX (Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest pay-
ments) which was the policy objective (with a target rate of 2.5 %) between November 1992 and
April 2004 when it was replaced by the Consumer Price Index (with a target rate of 2%). The CPI
data is only available since 1996, but also follows RPIX closely once a time trend is allowed for.
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interest rate equation, which describes the actual behavior of the central bank in
terms of a systematic component, including on lagged values of the output gap, the
ination rate and the interest rate; and an idiosyncratic component ui;t, which is
interpreted as the monetary policy shock. The full model is described as:
xt =xXt 1 + xit 1 + ux;t; (20)
it =iXt 1 + iit 1 + ui;t; (21)
where: xt = fgt; tg0, ux;t = fug;t; u;tg and Xt includes current and lagged values
of xt and it 1. The complete description of all the equations of the model, their state
space representation and how they are mapped into the system in equation (1) is in
Appendix 3. The parameters of the policy rule (21) are initially determined by max-
imum likelihood (ML) estimation along with those of the state equations (20). We
refer to these as the ML models. The likelihood-based estimation of the parameters
entering (20) and (21) is straightforward: given an initial set of parameters values
(typically this employs the OLS estimates of the homoskedastic model), a vector of
shocks and a sample of the observations, the likelihood function is computed through
the Kalman lter, and the original parameter values updated using simplex meth-
ods. Appendix 3 also describes the likelihood function, while appendix 1 species the
admissibility conditions imposed on the covariance structure to estimate the model
under state dependence.
Having then obtained the maximum likelihood estimates of the model, we use
the estimated equations for the state variables to mimic the law of motion in the
optimization problem and then replace the coe¢ cients of the policy rule in the ML
models with those obtained from the optimization procedure. We refer to these as
the Direct Control (DC) models.
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Using the bar notation to denote steady state values, we note for use in section
5.2 that the steady state impact of g and  on the policy rate is:
it = + gg +
: (22)
This denotes the long run policy rule, and the actual denition of the coe¢ cients ,
g and  is also in appendix 3. Evidently the ML and DC models will incorporate
di¤erent types of policy rules, which in turn will lead to di¤erent long run values. In
particular, we note that  = 0 for the mean-adjusted ML models, but can be non-zero
when the equilibrium is shifted by the linear dependence e¤ect in the heteroskedastic
DC models. With i = ; g = 0 in a non-accelerating ination equilibrium we have:
i =  = =(1   ); where the denominator is negative under the Taylor (1993)
principle  > 1. The stochastic structure of the model is of the form (4) and
specied in appendix 3.
4 The empirical (ML) models
Appendix 3 derives the likelihood function for the model formed by (20), (21) and (38)
and outlines the ML estimation procedure. We start by estimating the homoskedas-
tic model ML0, which provides a set of baseline parameters for the dynamic model
(1). This model has a likelihood value of (-) 122.7, as reported in Table 2. Then
the likelihood is optimized with respect to the parameters of the stochastic structure
(4) keeping these baseline parameters xed. This two-stage exercise immediately
reveals the signicance of state-dependent volatility. Table 2 shows that the like-
lihood increases to (-) 70.2 once linear dependence is allowed for (in model ML01)
and increases further to (-) 63.1 when an additional allowance is made for quadratic
dependence (in model ML03). Quadratic dependence on its own (ML02) does not
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produce as large an improvement in t as these two models. These ML0X, where
X=1,2,3, models are used in the next section to study the e¤ects on optimal mon-
etary policy and welfare of changing the stochastic structure (4) while keeping the
parameters of the dynamic model (1) unchanged.
We then used these results as the starting values for a fully optimized set of models
(respectively MLX, for X=1,2,3) in which all relevant parameters were optimized.
This produces a further modest improvement in t. Table 3 reports these fully
optimized ML results. Model ML3 has 29 parameters and a likelihood value of (-)
56.14.5 The table compares this value (lnLu) with that of each restricted model
(lnLr). It reports the loglikelihood ratio test statistic 2(lnLu   lnLr), which has
the 1% critical values 2(3) =11.35 and 2(6) =15.09. All three restricted models
are rejected on test. However, to guard against overtting the table also reports the
di¤erence in the Schwarz approximation to the Posterior Odds ratio (SCA=(lnLu  
lnLr)-0.5(ku kr) ln(T )) as proposed by Canova (2007). On this criterion the pure
quadratic variance model ML2 is decisively rejected against the encompassing model,
as is the homoskedastic model ML0. The performance of the linear variance model
ML1 is very similar to that of ML3 on this criterion. These tests strongly support the
ination-conditional volatility hypothesis. The results in Table 3 are consistent with
a large body of the empirical literature in support of the relevance of this hypothesis
in UK data, Grier and Perry (1996), Fountas, Karanasos, and Kim (2002), Fountas,
Ioannidis, and Karanasos (2004), Conrad, Karanasos, and Zeng (2010).
4.1 Parameter estimates and residuals
Table 4 reports estimates of the parameters of these MLX models. The one-quarter-
ahead forecast values and 95% condence intervals for the three macro variables in
5These are: a vector a comprising three parameters a1, a2 and a3, i.e. a(3); b(4); c(9); i;G (1) ;
g(2); D0(3); D1(3) and D2(3):
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ML3 are shown in the upper panels of gures 1-3, while the lower panels show the
unconditioned residuals (the us in (38)) and their error bands. ML3 conditions
the variance structure using both linear and quadratic ination terms, although the
quadratic component is not signicant in the base rate equation. This e¤ect is evident
in these gures, meaning that volatility is particularly high when ination is elevated
between 1979 and 1982. These gures all show a very low level of volatility between
1994 and 2003 - the period of the NICE decade. This was interrupted by the recent
credit crunch, which is reected in large negative outliers in the nal quarter of 2008
and rst quarter of 2009, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, the
subsequent residuals remain low, consistent with the low volatility implied by the
relatively low level of ination.
Importantly, conditioning the error structure in this way means that the likelihood
function in models ML1-3 discount the large errors (the us in (38)) that occur
during the high ination period. This means that the errors in that period tend
to be larger than in ML0. Consequently the sum of squared errors (u2) is higher
in ML3 (635.3) than in ML1 (619.7) and ML0 (579.9). In this sense, the standard
homoskedastic model underestimates the degree of macroeconomic volatility. Thus,
we see that neglecting the ination conditional volatility e¤ect leads researchers to
signicantly understate the volatility of the system. This conditioning also a¤ects the
deterministic parameters in these models because it acts like a weighted regression
system that gives observations a weight that varies inversely with ination.
4.2 The empirical impulse responses
The dynamic properties of these models can be seen from the impulse responses,
which show the e¤ects of innovations in the macroeconomic variables on the system.
Because the reduced form innovations (u0ts) are correlated empirically, we work with
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orthogonalized innovations using the triangular factorization dened in (38). The
orthogonalized impulse responses show the e¤ect on the macroeconomic system of
increasing each of these shocks by one percentage point for one or several periods
using the Wald representation of the system. This arrangement is a¤ected by the or-
dering of the macroeconomic variables. We adopt the standard ordering: fgt; t; itg;
interpreting vg as a positive demand shock, v as a negative supply shock, and vi as
a contractionary monetary shock. As noted in section 2.2, we need to distinguish one
period shocks in which the impulse response functions depend only on the parame-
ters of the deterministic equation (1) and longer-lasting shocks in which non-linear
amplied and asymmetric responses can occur.
Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of unit one period shocks in fgt; t; itg: The impulse
response functions for ML0, ML1, ML2 and ML3 are shown by dotted; dashed; thin
continuous and thick continuous continuous schedules respectively. A temporary
shock in real output leads to a decline of ination on impact and an increase in the
nominal rate. The initial e¤ect on the nominal rate in the heteroskedastic models is
larger than in ML0. The increase in ination pushes up output initially, but then
output declines in all four models as the real rate responds. A nominal rate shock
causes output and ination to fall in all three models.
Figure 5 plots the responses of the output gap, annual ination and annual in-
terest rate to a 5 year sequence of positive (continuous lines) and negative (dashed
lines) unit shocks to ination.6 To analyze the amplication and asymmetric e¤ects
emerging under conditional volatility we keep the dynamic parameters of equation
(1) xed across these models and use the baseline ML0X variants shown in table 2.
In the homoskedastic model ML0, the increase in ination looks like a linear trend
6The amplication and asymmetric e¤ects under linear quadratic dependence are also visible
when cosidering permanent shocks to both output and ination.
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over the 5 year period and output declines because the nominal rate increases more
than ination. The patterns for negative shocks are mirror images of these. The
amplication e¤ect is clearly evident for a sequence of positive shocks in the het-
eroskedastic models: ination increases more than in the homoskedastic model and
the amplication e¤ect is largest under ML03. This leads to larger responses of the
nominal rate, which depress output.
In the pure quadratic models ML2 and DC02, the linear dependence e¤ect is
absent and the simulated values from pairs of antithetical simulations are mirror
images of each other as in ML0. However, the asymmetry of the responses is evident
under both ML01 and ML03 when the economy is hit by a sequence of negative
ination shocks. As explained in section 2.2 and appendix 1, this attenuation e¤ect
puts a lower bound on the variable driving volatility,7 as in the Cox, Ingersoll, and
Ross (1985) model.8 Ination approaches the lower bound after about 10 periods in
the ML01 simulation. This linear dependence e¤ect is also a feature of the ML03
and DC03 models but is o¤set by the quadratic amplication e¤ect which dominates
at high or low ination rates. This e¤ect removes the lower bound on ination, as
appendix 1 explains.
5 Optimal control
Sections 2 and 3 showed how dynamic linear models with state-dependent variance
structures could be employed for the study of optimal macroeconomic policy. The
previous section used a simple macroeconomic model with a variance structure that
allows for linear and quadratic dependence on the lagged ination rate to capture
7 If the simulated value of ination approaches the lower bound this shuts down the volatility
structure temporarily. However mean reversion means that the ination rate then tends to move
back up slowly, switching the volatility back on.
8 In the continuous time CIR model, the interest rate drives its own volatility and is non-negative,
having an asymmetric non-central 2 distribution.
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the ination conditional volatility e¤ect found in empirical studies of UK data. In
this section we use these results to quantify the welfare costs of UK macroeconomic
volatility and its e¤ect on the conduct of optimal monetary policy. In order to
analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent stochastic and welfare specications, in this section
we use the benchmark parameter estimates (shown as ML0 in table 4) for the two
state equations (18) and (19) throughout, alongside the stochastic parameters shown
in table 2 for the benchmark ML0X heteroskedastic models.9 We then replace the
empirical Taylor rules by the optimal base rate rules implied by di¤erent stochastic
structures and welfare weights. We label the models under control derived from ML0,
ML01, ML02 and ML03 as DC0, DC01, DC02 and DC03 respectively. Appendix 2
describes how we combine the state equations and the optimal policy rule to form
the model under control used for impulse response and welfare analysis.
5.1 Steady state base rate responses
Columns 2-6 of Table 5 present the long run coe¢ cients implied by the optimal policy
rules for the four di¤erent ML0X stochastic specications under the ve di¤erent
specications of the welfare weights used by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).10 The
rst column reports the long run coe¢ cients of the benchmark empirical policy rule
implied by ML0. We used a stylized assumption about the discount rate, which is
set at six percent.
Several patterns are apparent in this table. First, reading across the table we
see the e¤ect of di¤erent welfare weights. The rst set of weights is a benchmark
that gives ination, output and base rate smoothing equal weight in the loss function
9Results for the fully estimated heteroskedastic MLX models (ML1-ML3), which include the
additional e¤ect of changes in the estimated parameters (18) and (19), are qualitatively similar and
available upon request.
10These parameter sets are also used by Rudebusch (2002) in his analysis of money GDP rules
for the UK.
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( =  = 1). The second set shows the e¤ect of reducing the base rate smoothing
parameter, which makes the monetary authorities more responsive to increases in
both ination and output. The third set shows the e¤ect of then reducing the weight
given to the output gap, making the monetary authorities still more aggressive in
response to rising ination. The fourth set shows the e¤ect of attaching a much
higher weight to output volatility than in cases 2 and 3, while the last specication
considers a case in which much less weight is given to changes in the policy instrument
than in case 1.
Reecting the results of sections 2 and 3, we see that because they use the
same state equations, the policy responses in DC01 are identical to those of the
homoskedastic model DC0. However linear dependence has the e¤ect of introducing
a positive intercept () into the base rate equation in DC01, depressing the steady
state rate of ination (). In DC02, quadratic dependence has the e¤ect of making
policy much more responsive to ination, without a¤ecting the steady state. In DC03
both e¤ects are present: the shift in  is slightly larger, but the more aggressive ina-
tion response has the e¤ect of damping the e¤ect on the steady state rate of ination
compared to DC01.
In contrast to optimal control studies of US monetary policy, which generally
nd that the optimal long run responses to ination in a standard homoskedastic
model are larger in absolute value than those implied by the empirical estimates,
the optimal control responses in our equivalent DC0 model tend to straddle the
empirical benchmark shown in the rst column. The optimal ination responses in
the heteroskedastic models DC02 and DC03 are naturally more aggressive. These
responses are all larger than those proposed by Taylor (1993). The output responses
are much higher than observed empirically since 1979. This is true for all models
and welfare specications. We also nd that the optimal output gap response is still
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much larger than the empirical one even when the model is simulated with  = 0.
This is because the output gap acts as a leading indicator of movement in ination,
an observation that might justify the prominence of the negative output gap in the
Monetary Policy Committees deliberations of monetary policy at the moment.
5.2 The optimal impulse responses
Section 4.2 discussed the impulse responses for the three ML models. In this section
we compare the responses to unit one period shocks for the benchmark models under
control, DC0, DC02 and DC03.11 These are shown in gure 6 as the dotted, dashed
and continuous schedules respectively. We only present the results for the rst set
of welfare parameters  =  = 1 since the results are not markedly a¤ected by
alternative choices. The policy rate is far more responsive to output and ination
shocks than under the empirical rules in the homoskedastic models. This is reected
in the much sharper response in output shown in the top panel. Consistent with the
theory, the policy response for DC03 is more aggressive than for the other models.
The simulations reported in the next section are designed to show the responses of
the model to longer-lasting sequences of random shocks.12
5.3 Welfare analysis
How would policy optimization have a¤ected the volatility of the system and the
imputed welfare losses? To answer this we follow Sack (2000) and simulate the various
models and welfare specications stochastically, recording the standard deviations
of output, ination and interest rate changes and the welfare losses. We start by
creating a at benchmark path setting the starting values in the state vector to zero,
to keep the steady state values in line with the zero mean of the empirical sample.
11The responses for DC01 are identical to those for DC0, as in table 4.
12A gure showing the e¤ect of 5 year sequence of unit shocks to ination comparable with that
of gure 5 for the ML0X models is available upon request.
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Then, reecting the change in the steady state rate of ination implied by DC01
and DC03, we reduce the benchmark path for ination for these two models by the
respective value of  shown in table 5. We then use the Matlab function randn,
which produces standardized random normal variates, to generate 500 random paths
for the homoskedastic errors (the vs in (3) and (38)). Changing the sign on these
then gives a total of 1,000 antithetical normal variates.13 This set is then used to
perturb the benchmark path using (1) and (3) in each model/weight combination.
Although these sets of shocks are the same for each such combination, it is important
to note that the nal disturbances (the us) generated by (3) can be very di¤erent,
particularly for sequences of large shocks with the same sign. The use of antithetical
variable shocks makes the simulation results for positive and negative residual tracks
symmetric for the ML0, DC0, ML02 and DC02 models. However, recall that in the
linear dependence models ML01 and DC01, a series of negative output and ination
shocks has the cumulative e¤ect of lowering the simulated value of ination, thus
attenuating the e¤ect of future shocks. This linear dependence e¤ect is also a feature
of the ML03 and DC03 models but is o¤set by the quadratic dependence e¤ect which
dominates at high or low ination rates, amplifying volatility.
Table 6 shows the results obtained by simulating the ML models with their em-
pirical policy rules. The rst three columns of numbers show the standard deviations
of the three goal variables and the remaining columns show the welfare losses implied
by the ve welfare specications used in table 5. The losses fall as we move from
case 1 to 3 reducing respectively the base rate smoothing and output weights. Case 4
shows the e¤ect of a large output weight and case 5 that of a very low rate smoothing
weight. This table shows a fall in the volatility of ination and interest rates in ML01
compared to ML0. This reects the asymmetric volatility attenuation e¤ect of low
13We trim 10% of the simulated series to eliminate the impact of extreme draws.
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ination paths noted earlier. The quadratic amplication e¤ect in ML02 increases
the variances of the goal variables and hence the welfare losses compared to the other
models. Again, ML03 combines both e¤ects and implies a welfare loss somewhere
between that of ML01 and ML02.
Table 7 compares the results obtained by simulating the three models with the
optimal policy rule using the ve welfare specications to get the DC results. These
welfare specications a¤ect the policy rules and hence the volatilities of the goal
variables. Optimization reduces the welfare loss relative to the empirical rules, with
the percentage welfare gains being shown in the nal column. In the DC0 speci-
cation, the gain is achieved by reducing the variability of ination at the expense
of increasing that of output and/or interest rates. The variances are xed in this
specication (t = 0), so a reduction in the variance of one variable has to be
traded o¤ against an increase in that of another. However, the low downside risk in
DC01 makes it optimal to lower the steady state ination rate (as shown in table 5),
thus shifting the trade-o¤ and reducing the overall variability of the system. DC01
is able to reduce the variability of all the goal variables compared to DC0, for all of
these welfare parameter values. Optimization makes a much bigger di¤erence in this
case than it does in the standard model, even though it comes through a reduction in
the steady state (like a reduction in the ination target) and not an increase in the
level of aggression. As we saw in table 6, the quadratic amplication e¤ect increases
the welfare losses in ML02 compared to the other models, but the gains from opti-
mization are nevertheless bigger than in the standard model, taking the form of a
change in the level of aggression without a¤ecting the steady state. DC03 combines
both a more aggressive stance and a shift in the steady state (shown in table 5) and
reduces the welfare losses to about a fth of those implied in ML03. These results
suggest that mis-specication of the variance structure can lead the researchers to
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seriously understate the potential gains from optimization.
6 Conclusion
Time varying stochastic volatility is remarkably signicant in UK macroeconomic
data; our empirical results show that this feature can be well captured by a simple
state dependent macroeconomic model in which the variance of the output gap,
ination and interest rate data exhibits quadratic as well as linear dependence. This
phenomenon helps explain the NICE decade, the UK equivalent of the US Great
Moderation or low volatility era that characterized the years between the recessions
of the early 1990s and the late 2000s. The empirical model regards the large output
and interest shocks in the nal quarter of 2008 following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers as outliers, since subsequent surprises have apparently returned to the low
volatility implied by the relatively low rate of ination. The empirical results suggest
that the conventional model signicantly understates the degree of volatility in the
macroeconomy as well as neglecting its association with the level of ination.
There is a burgeoning empirical literature highlighting the role of time varying
macroeconomic volatility as a feature of macroeconomic data in most industrialized
countries. This paper is the rst to explore the implications of this for the design
of optimal monetary policy and the analysis of the welfare costs of ination. The-
oretically, linear dependence reduces the risk of deation and makes it optimal for
monetary authorities to reduce the ination target relative to both the sample mean
of the data and the homoskedastic optimization model target. The optimal policy
calculations reveal that, depending upon the welfare specication, this e¤ect would
have reduced the target by one or two percentage points compared to the sample
mean of 4 34%, in turn reducing the welfare losses (in DC01) relative to those implied
by the optimization of the homoskedastic specication (DC0).
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We nd that optimizing the standard homoskedastic model implies a level of
aggression comparable to that seem empirically since 1979. However, this model is
dominated empirically by the heteroskedastic model ML3, which implies a higher
level of macroeconomic volatility and makes it optimal for the monetary authorities
to react more aggressively to ination shocks. The welfare costs under the optimal
rule are about a fth of those implied by the empirical rule for this model. These
cost reductions are much larger than those suggested by the conventional model.
We believe that this paper opens the way to the more general use of time-varying
macroeconomic volatility models in optimal policy analysis. The paper analyses the
policy implications of state dependent volatility in the conduct of optimal monetary
policy abstracting from issues such as parameter uncertainty (Sack (2000), Soder-
strom (2002)) or learning about the unknown state of the economy (Ellison and
Valla (2001)). These additional considerations could make optimal policy rules more
or less aggressive relative to the benchmark analysis in this paper, and are potentially
interesting extensions of the analysis provided here. However, they are unlikely to
change the central result of this paper, which is that mis-specication of the vari-
ance structure can lead researchers to seriously understate both the welfare cost of
ination and the potential gains from optimization.
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Appendix 1: Admissibility
A stochastic volatility specication is said to be admissible if it ensures that the
variance structure remains non-negative denite. This is guaranteed in a mean-
reverting continuous-time model when there is a single square root volatility factor,
essentially because the volatility goes to zero gradually as the interest rate or other
variable driving the volatility goes to zero, allowing the system to mean revert.14 If
the variance of ination is driven by (39) with k =  and ;2 = 0 (which gives a
model of the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) type):
;t = ;0 + ;1
a
t 1  0
then the variance exhibits linear dependence and is shut o¤ at ;t = 0: This puts a
lower bound on the driving variable of amin =  ;0=;1  0: For example using the
parameters for ML01 shown in table 0 gives a lower bound of amin =  1:01=0:3185 =
 3:1711 on the Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) denition (that follows (19)), as
reected in gure 5. This is  12:684% when expressed as an annual logarithmic
change. :
Admissibility is more problematic in discrete time square root volatility models
(i.e. linear-dependent variance structures) because these use a Gaussian approxi-
mation (due originally to Sun (1992)) allowing the driving variable to turn negative
during a discrete time interval. However this is not a problem in our linear-quadratic
specication. In this case, we simply need to ensure that the eigenvalues of the vari-
ance structure remain non-negative for all possible values of the driving variable (in
14 It is however a problem in multi-factor correlated square root (CSR) volatility models. Dai and
Singleton (2000) show that these are admissible only if the factors are negatively correlated, while
empirical evidence is that they are positively correlated.
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this paper, z = a). These are given by (39) requiring k;t  0; k = g; ; i:
k;t = k;0 + k;1
a
t 1 + k;2
a
t 1
2  0:
This is ensured provided that 4k;0k;2  2k;1 so that the roots of the associated
quadratic equation are complex. The absence of a real valued solution means that
there is no lower bound, although the linear component does reduce downside risk
relative to the pure quadratic model 2. Empirically, the linear term k;1 is typically
small compared to the constant and quadratic terms so that this is not an issue. Our
Matlab code automatically checks that this restriction is satised.
Appendix 2: Representing the general problem in canonical
form
This appendix explores the general implications of the dynamic stochastic framework
set out in sections 2.1 and 2.2, assuming that the policy maker has a canonical
quadratic loss function dened over state variables and instruments:
Lt =
1X
j=0
t+jEt[(Xt+j X)0(Xt+j X)+ (it+j i)2+2(Xt+j X)0H (it+j i)];
(23)
where Et is the time t conditional expectations operator;  is the discount factor; X
and i are target or bliss vectors forXt+j and it+j respectively;  andH are matrices
of constant welfare weights; and  is a weight attached to deviations of the policy
instruments from target. The policy maker is assumed to choose the intertemporal
sequence of policy instruments fit+jg1j=0 that minimizes the loss function (23) given
the model of the economy in (1)-(4) and the initial state vector Xt.
This minimization problem can be solved using standard dynamic programming
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techniques. Since the per-period loss function is quadratic and the dynamics are
linear, the value function in the canonical problem takes the form (7). The optimal
policy is then found from the solution of a recursive Bellman equation that is obtained
by substituting (23) into (6) and using (7) to replace J (Xt+1):
J (Xt) =min
it
[(Xt  X)0 (Xt  X) + (it   i)2 + 2 (Xt  X)0H(it   i)
+Et
 
X0t+1PXt+1   2X0t+1p+ c

]:
This is optimized subject to the constraints (1) and (4). Evaluating expectations
using these constraints gives the conditional volatility problem:
J (Xt) = min
it
8>><>>:
(Xt  X)0 (Xt  X) + (it   i)2 + 2 (Xt  X)0H(it   i) + c+ It
+tr (P1)X
0
tsz + tr (P2)X
0
tSzXt:
9>>=>>; ;
(24)
where It is dened in equation (9). The rst line of (24) shows the Bellman form of
the standard homoskedastic control problem, in which: 1= 2= 0. In this case, the
target rate for the variables in Xt is the sample mean and if the model is specied
in terms of mean-di¤erences then: X = 0. The certainty equivalence principle
also holds in this case. The last two terms of (24) capture the e¤ect of the state
dependent variance structure on the control problem. Since these are, respectively,
linear and quadratic in Xt, they a¤ect the coe¢ cients of the optimal policy rule.
However, we can consolidate these with the other linear and quadratic terms and
write the loss function in the canonical form given by the rst two lines of (24) by
setting: 1= 2= 0 and replacing the welfare parameters ;X
; i and c in (23) by
33
~; ~X;~{ and ~c to get:
Lt =
1X
j=0
t+jEt[(Xt+j ~X)0~(Xt+j ~X)+ (it+j ~{)2+2(Xt+j ~X)0H (it+j ~{)];
(25)
where:
~=+tr (P2)Sz (26)
~X = (~ HH0=) 1[( HH0=)X   tr (P1) sz=2] (27)
~{ = i +H0

X   ~X

= (28)
~c= c+
h
X0X   ~X0~X   (i   ~{)2
i
=   2X0HH0

X   ~X

=: (29)
This allows the optimization problem to be expressed in the form of the standard
Bellman equation:
J (Xt) = min
it
[(Xt  ~X)0~(Xt  ~X)+(it ~{)2+2

Xt   ~X
0
H(it ~{)+~c+It]:
(30)
To demonstrate the equivalence of (24) and (30), we expand the rst quadratic
term in (24) and use (26) to rearrange this as:
J (Xt) = min
it
8>><>>:
X0t~Xt   2X0t[X   tr (P1) sz=2] +X0X + (it   i)2
+2 (Xt  X)0H(it   i) + c+ It
9>>=>>; :
(31)
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We then write (30) as:
J (Xt) = min
it
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
X0t~Xt   2X0t~~X

+ ~X0~~X
+[(it   i)2 + (i   ~{)2 + 2(it   i)(i   ~{)] + It + ~c
2 (Xt  X)0H(it   i) + 2 (Xt  X)0H(i   ~{) + 2

X   ~X
0
H(it   ~{)
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
:
(32)
Equating (31) and (32) and cancelling common terms, we require:
X0X + c  2X0t[X   tr (P1) sz=2]
= ~X0~X   2X0t~~X

+ (i   ~{)2 + 2 (Xt  X)0H(i   ~{) + ~c;
+2[(i   ~{) + 2

X   ~X
0
H](it   i)
= ~X0~~X   2X0t~~X

+ [(i   ~{)2]  2 (Xt  X)0HH0

X   ~X

= + ~c;
where the last line follows by substituting condition (28). Equating the coe¢ cients
of Xt gives [X
   tr (P1) sz=2] = ~~X +HH0

X   ~X

=; with the solution
(27). Finally, equating the respective intercept terms gives (29).
The solution can then be obtained by appropriate use of the algorithms devel-
oped for the standard homoskedastic problem (Lungqvist and Sargent (2004)). If
the parameters of (1) and (4) are independent of the policy rule as they are for ex-
ample in the model developed in section 3, the optimal value is obtained simply by
di¤erentiating (30) w.r.t. it to get the closed loop solution:
it =  + Xt (33)
 = (+0P) 1 0p (34)
=  (+0P) 1 (H0+0P) : (35)
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The matrices 1 and 2 showing the e¤ect of the linear and quadratic volatility
terms a¤ect the policy rule indirectly, through the parameters p and P of the value
function (7). These values are obtained by substituting (33) - (35) back into (30)
and equating with (7) to obtain the standard formula:
p =

I  ( +)0 1 h~ + 0H0 ~X+  0 +H ii (36)
and the standard Riccati equation:
P=~  (H0+0P)0 (+0P) 1 (H0+0P) + 0P: (37)
The optimal response coe¢ cients are then obtained by solving (37) numerically and
substituting P back into (36), and (33) - (35).
A Appendix 3: Estimating and optimizing the empirical model
This canonical model of section 2 and appendix 1 can be used to describe various
models appearing in the control literature. In this appendix we show how the em-
pirical model of section 3 ts into this general structure and describe the estimation
procedure. We then show how we obtain the policy rule implied by the state equa-
tions and the loss function of section 2.4.
A.1 The stochastic structure
The residuals in (20) and (21) are potentially heteroskedastic, driven by the annual
CED ination rate (lagged one quarter):
2664ux;t
ui;t
3775 =
2664G02
g0 1
3775
2664D
1=2
x;t 02
002 
1=2
i;t
3775
2664vx;t
vi;t
3775 (38)
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where:
Dx;t =Dx;0 +Dx;1
a
t 1 +Dx;2(
a
t 1)
2 (39)
i;t = i;0 + i;1
a
t 1 + i;2(
a
t 1)
2
and where G =
2664 1 0
g1 1
3775 and g0 = fg2; g3g0 include constant parameters; vx;t =
fvg;t; v;tg0  N (02; I2) and vi;t  N (0; 1) are Gaussian homoskedastic shocks to
output, ination and interest rate respectively; Dx;j = diagfg;j ; ;jg, j = 0; 1; 2;
with g;j ; and ;j again denoting constant parameters.15
The state space form
Equations (18) and (19) describing the current state variables of the system x0t =
fgt; tg can be written in the matrix form (20) using
x =
2664a1  a3=4 a3=4 a2  a3=4 a3=4 0  a3=4 a3=4 0  a3=4
b5 b1 0 0 b2 0 0 b3 0 0 b4
3775
X0t =

x0t; it 1;x
0
t 1; it 2;x
0
t 2; it 3;x
0
t 3
	
0x = fa3=4; 0g:
The policy interest rate can be written as
it = iit 1 + c1gt 1 + c2t 1 + c3it 2 + c4gt 2 + c5t 2 + c6it 3 + c7t 3
+c8it 4 + c9t 4 + ui;t
15 In this paper, diagfg represents a matrix with the elements of the row vector  in the main
diagonal and zeros elsewhere. 0a is the (a  1)  1 zero vector; 1a is the (a  1)  1 summation
vector; 0a;b the (a b) zero matrix; and Ia the a2 identity matrix.
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which can then be arranged in a form compatible with equation (21) using:
i = fc1;c2;c3; c4;c5;c6; 0; c7;c8; 0; c9g:
The interest rate rule in the long run is written in equation (22), using:
g = (c1 + c4)=(i + c3 + c6 + c8) (40)
 = (c2 + c5 + c7 + c9)=(i + c3 + c6 + c8): (41)
The coe¢ cient  = 0 for the mean-adjusted ML models, but can be non-zero when
the equilibrium is shifted by a change in the rate setting equation, as in some of the
optimized models for example. The evolution of the state vector is described by the
companion form (1), where specically: 0 = f0i;009g, and U0t =

u0x;t;0
0
9
	
are 111
decient coe¢ cient and error vectors and:
 =
2666666666666666666666666664
fa1; a3=4g a3=4 fa2; a3=4g a3=4 f0; a3=4g a3=4 f0; a3=4g
fb5; b1g 0 f0; b2g 0 f0; b3g 0 f0; b4g
002 0 0
0
2 0 0
0
2 0 0
0
2
I2 02 02;2 02 02;2 02 02;2
002 1 0
0
2 0 0
0
2 0 0
0
2
02;2 02 I2 02 02;2 02 02;2
002 0 0
0
2 1 0
0
2 0 0
0
2
02;2 02 02;2 02 I2 02 02;2
3777777777777777777777777775
:16
16 In this paper, 0a is the (a 1) 1 zero vector; 1a is the (a 1) 1 summation vector; 0a;b the
(a b) zero matrix; and Ia the a2 identity matrix. Diagfg represents a matrix with the elements
of the row vector  in the main diagonal and zeros elsewhere.
38
Finally, to put (38) into form (1) we dene:
Ut  N (011;t)
where t is dened in (4) specifying: z = a;
j =  j 
0;
 =
2664 G 02;9
09;2 011;11
3775 ;
and: j = diagfg;j ; ;j ;009g, j = 0; 1; 2:
The likelihood function
Next we derive the likelihood function of the model of section 3 and describe the
numerical optimization procedure. Write (20) and (21) as:
zt =
2664x
i
3775+Xt 1
2664x
i
3775 it 1 +
2664ux;t
ui;t
3775 (42a)
=Xt 1 + it 1 + ut: (42b)
Similarly, write (38) as:
ut =CD
1=2
t vt (43)
vt N (03; I3)
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where: z0t = fx0t; itg ; u0t =

u0x;t; ui;t
	
; v0t =

v0x;t; vi;t
	
and:
C =
2664G03
g0 1
3775 ; Dt =
2664Dx;t 03
003 i;t
3775 : (44)
Then using (43):
vt =C
 1D 1=2t ut
=C 1D 1=2t [zt Xt 1   it 1]
vt N (03; I3)
Thus the loglikelihood for period t can be written as:
Lt =  1
2
ln(2)  1
2
ln(jDtj)  1
2
v0tD
 1
t vt (45)
Summing this over T periods gives the loglikelihood for the estimation period:
L =  2T ln(2)  1
2
TX
t=1
ln(jDtj)  1
2
kX
=1
v0tD
 1
t vt:
This likelihood function was maximized using the FindMinimum numerical optimiza-
tion package on Matlab.
Policy optimization
First, the Rotemberg-Woodford type welfare function (5) used in the model of section
3 is put into the canonical form (23) using:
 = Sa+Sg+Si; H =  si; X = sa : (46)
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where: sa = 0:25[0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 0]0 and S = ss0.
The model under control consists of the state equations (20) and the policy rule
(14). Following Polito and Wickens (2011), we partition the vector  = f1; 2; 3g
conformably with {xt; Xt 1; it 1g and stack these equations to obtain
2664 I2 0
 1 1
3775
2664xt
it
3775 =
266402

3775+
2664x x
2 3
3775
2664Xt 1
it 1
3775+
2664ux;t
0
3775 : (47)
This can be solved to obtain the reduced form system that is congruent with (42a):
2664xt
it
3775 =
266402

3775+
2664x
i
3775Xt 1 +
2664x
i
3775 it 1 +
2664 ux;t
1ux;t
3775 ; (48)
where:
i =i(P) = 1(P)x + 2(P); (49)
i = i(P) = 1(P)x + 3(P);
1 = 1(P)
 =  (P)
and where the relationships  (P), 1(P); 2(P) and 3(P) follow from the restrictions
(15)-(17) and (49), with P = fx;x; ; ; g.17 Substituting stylized values for , 
and  as well as the ML parameters ^x and ^x from (42a) into (48) gives the Direct
Control (DC) model used for impulse response and welfare analysis in section 5.
17We normalise the welfare weight to ination to unity, so that  and  measure the welfare weight
attached to output gap stabilisation and interest rate smoothing relative to ination stabilisation.
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B Tables and Figures
Table 1: Data summary statistics: 1979Q3-2010Q4
Mean Standard Skewness Excess First order KPSS ADF
deviation kurtosis Autocorrel.
g -0.329 2.481 -0.467 0.219 0.975 0.267 -4.249
 1.190 0.900 1.653 1.699 0.951 0.766 -1.755
i 1.941 0.962 0.335 -0.655 0.963 0.941 -1.176
Note: Output gap (g) is from OECD; CED ination () and the base rate (i) are from Datastream.
Mean denotes sample arithmetic mean expressed as percentage p.a.; KPSS is the Kwiatowski et al
(1992) statistic for the null hypothesis of level stationarity and ADF is the Adjusted Dickey-Fuller
statistic for the null of non-stationarity. The 5% signicance levels are 0.463 and (-)2.877 respectively.
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Table 2: Baseline estimates
Model ML0 ML01 ML02 ML03
Loglikelihood value (-) 122.7 (-) 70.16 (-) 97.281 (-) 63.09
Number of 
Parameters
6 9 9 12
Initial estimates
0
1
2
g;0
;0
i;0
g;1
;1
i;1
g;2
;2
i;2
0.4784
1.0893
0.6551
0.4953
1.0100
0.6905
0.2643
0.3184
0.3967
0.301 4
0.4946
0..6547
0.0788
0.3089
2.2510 6
0.4131
0.6056
0.7420
0.2403
0.3283
0.4486
0.0257
0.2943
1.2610 2
G g1
g2
g3
-0.5011
0.5942
0.1559
-0.4035
0.5052
0.1303
-0.2254
0.6372
0.1559
-0.1909
0.5272
0.1270
Note: Model ML0 is the baseline homoskedastic model. This provides a set of baseline
parameters for the dynamic model (1). In the ML0X approach, the likelihood is then opti-
mized with respect to the parameters of the stochastic structure (4) keeping these baseline
parameters xed. ML01 assumes that the error variances are linear in the (lagged) annual
rate of ination while ML02 assumes that the variances are quadratic in this rate. The
encompassing model ML03 includes both linear and quadratic e¤ects. The fully optimized
results are reported in the next two tables..
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Table 3: Loglikelihood ratio tests
Model ML0 ML1 ML2 ML3
Loglikelihood value (logL) -122.70 - 63.24 - 96.81 - 56.14
Number of Parameters (k) 23 26 26 29
LR test (against M3)
133.12
 2(6)
14.20
 2(3)
81.34
 2(3)
SCA test (against M3) - 52.06 - 0.16 - 33.40
Note: In the ML approach, the interest rate equation (21) is estimated alongside the struc-
tural equations (20) using maximum likelihood. Model ML0 assumes a homoskedastic
error structure. ML1 assumes that the error variances are linear in the (lagged) an-
nual rate of ination while ML2 assumes that the variances are quadratic in this rate.
The encompassing model ML3 includes both linear and quadratic terms. Its likelihood
value (Lu) is compared with that of each restricted model (Lr) using a loglikelihood
ratio test LR=(2(lnLu   lnLr)), which has the 1% critical values 2(3)=11.35 and
2(6)=15.09. All three restricted models are rejected on this test. The Schwarz statistic
(SCA=(lnLu   lnLr)-0.5(ku kr) ln(T )) guards against over-tting and provides an
asymptotically consistent test. On this criterion, ML0 and ML2 are decisively rejected
against ML3, while the performance of ML1 and ML3 are similar.
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Table 4: Parameter estimates for ML models
ML0 ML1 ML2 ML3
par. t-stat par. t-stat par. t-stat. par. t-stat.
g1 -0.5011 3.91 -0.4700 3.10 -0.2647 3.00 -0.2617 2.38
g2 0.5942 5.65 0.4353 2.90 0.6311 3.77 0.4551 4.09
g3 0.1559 1.62 0.1502 2.80 0.1559 3.01 0.1401 3.85
a1 1.2930 16.67 1.4636 19.06 1.3785 16.90 1.4488 20.17
a2 -0.3495 4.41 -0.5047 6.11 -0.4204 5.07 0.4812 -6.29
a3 -0.0236 1.03 -0.0108 0.58 -0.0236 1.12 -0.0236 1.12
b1 0.3588 4.29 0.4213 4.82 0.3004 3.48 0.3666 4.22
b2 0.2887 3.38 0.2232 2.40 0.2320 2.61 0.2169 2.39
b3 0.1491 1.76 0.1044 1.17 0.1448 1.65 0.1176 1.31
b5 0.0972 2.53 0.0180 0.61 0.0793 2.55 0.0419 1.32
i 0.2602 2.34 0.2251 2.50 0.3150 2.83 0.1986 1.92
c1 0.2584 3.72 0.1955 3.21 0.2493 3.59 0.1736 2.56
c2 0.7941 9.11 0.9137 11.17 0.7941 9.11 0.9073 10.69
c3 -0.1423 1.36 -0.1169 1.40 -0.1900 1.82 -0.0902 0.85
c4 0.1204 1.69 0.0010 0.02 0.1116 1.56 0.0010 0.01
c5 0.0863 0.78 -0.0192 -0.17 0.0863 0.78 -0.0163 0.15
c6 0.0268 0.37 0.0010 0.01 0.0261 0.36 0.0010 0.01
c7 -0.0476 0.45 0.0521 0.36 -0.0476 0.45 -0.0424 0.41
c8 0.0119 0.15 0.0744 1.36 0.0306 0.40 0.0777 1.20
c9 0.0179 0.23 0.0687 0.95 0.0179 0.23 0.0666 0.96
g;0 0.4784 15.95 0.5007 13.28 0.2894 12.47 0.4088 13.28
;0 1.0893 11.50 0.9986 9.99 0.4674 10.91 0.6237 9.70
i;0 0.6553 14.95 0.6462 14.10 0.6547 15.95 0.7112 15.87
g;1 0.2792 10.01 0.2715 8.67
;1 0.3718 5.05 0.3754 5.05
i;1 0.3704 9.09 0.4307 9.99
g;2 9.2510 2 3.66 3.9410 2 2.35
;2 0.3174 4.00 0.2729 4.94
i;2 4.9110 7 0.01 1. 2310 2 0.66
Note: The model parameters are dened in (20), (21) and (38) and are estimated using maximum
likelihood (appendix 3).
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Table 5: Long run responses of estimated and optimal policy rules
ML0 DC0
==1 =1,=0.5 =0.2,=0.5 =5,=0.5 =1,=0.1
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
g 0.79 2.50 2.91 2.54 3.87 4.16
 2.80 2.89 3.13 5.06 1.73 3.79
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
ML01 DC01
 0.00 3.39 3.58 3.39 3.77 4.01
g 0.79 2.50 2.91 2.54 3.87 4.16
 2.80 2.89 3.13 5.06 1.73 3.79
 (0) -1.79 -1.68 -0.83 -5.16 -1.44
ML02 DC02
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
g 0.79 3.23 3.63 3.23 4.57 4.85
 2.80 6.77 7.24 8.16 6.63 8.55
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
ML03 DC03
 0.00 3.53 3.73 3.62 3.91 4.23
g 0.79 3.00 3.41 3.07 4.29 4.65
 2.80 5.59 6.02 7.44 4.68 7.22
 (0) -0.77 -0.74 -0.56 -1.06 -0.68
Note: The ML0X models are described in the footnote to table 2 and the DC0X models replace
the empirical interest rule with the appropriate optimal rule. The long run interest rate rule takes
the form i = +gg+
, where the long run coe¢ cients shown in (40) and (41) are computed
using the coe¢ cients of either the estimated or the optimal policy rule. The intercept is zero in
the MLX models and in DC0 since the data is de-meaned. Heteroskedasticity has the e¤ect of
inducing a positive  intercept, which reduces the steady state ination rate by  = =(1  )
in DC1 and DC3.
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Table 6: Volatilities and welfare losses implied by the empirical rules under di¤erent
welfare specications
Standard deviations Losses
Goal variables Welfare weights
gt t it Case: 1 2 3 4 5
 = 1
 = 1
 = 1
 = 0:5
 = 0:2
 = 0:5
 = 5
 = 0:5
 = 1
 = 0:2
Model
ML0
ML01
ML02
ML03
2.56
2.43
3.54
2.69
2.29
2.01
2.90
2.60
1.00
0.98
1.22
1.22
12.81
10.88
22.40
15.49
12.31
10.40
21.66
14.75
7.02
5.67
11.57
8.94
38.26
33.62
71.16
43.28
11.91
10.02
21.06
14.15
Note: This table shows the results obtained by simulating the ML0X models with the benchmark ML0 empirical
policy rule (and state equations) and the stochastic parameters shown in table 2. The rst three columns of numbers
show the standard deviations of the three goal variables and the remaining columns show the welfare losses implied
by the ve welfare specications used in table 5. The losses drop as we move from case 1 to 3 reducing respectively
the interest rate smoothing and output weights. Macro volatility is lower in ML1 than ML0 because sequences of
shocks that lower ination have the e¤ect of attenuating the e¤ect of later shocks. On the other hand, the quadratic
amplication e¤ect in ML02 increases volatility and welfare losses, while ML03 combines both linear attenuation and
quadratic amplication e¤ects.
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Table 7: Welfare gains from policy optimization
Empirical rules
Model
Welfare
loss
Optimal rules
Model
Standard deviations
gt t it
Welfare
loss
%
gain
Case 1,  =  = 1
ML0
ML01
ML02
ML03
12.81
10.88
22.40
15.49
DC0 2.22 1.95 0.89 9.52 0.26
DC01 1.91 1.22 0.66 5.59 0.49
DC02 2.72 1.72 1.99 14.29 0.36
DC03 1.56 0.79 0.83 3.75 0.76
Case 2,  = 1;  = 0:5
ML0
ML01
ML02
ML03
12.31
10.40
21.66
14.75
DC0 2.15 1.87 1.21 8.85 0.28
DC01 1.80 1.13 0.89 4.91 0.53
DC02 2.58 1.61 2.39 12.08 0.44
DC03 1.48 0.72 1.04 3.24 0.78
Case 3,  = 0:2;  = 0:5
ML0
ML01
ML02
ML03
7.02
5.67
11.57
8.94
DC0 2.63 1.88 1.08 5.49 0.22
DC01 1.96 1.12 0.64 2.22 0.61
DC02 2.97 1.68 2.13 6.87 0.41
DC03 1.74 0.82 0.94 1.72 0.81
Case 4:  = 5;  = 0:5
ML0
ML01
ML02
ML03
38.26
33.62
71.16
43.28
DC0 1.82 1.98 2.12 22.64 0.41
DC01 1.87 1.37 2.09 21.49 0.36
DC02 2.21 1.54 3.45 32.80 0.54
DC03 1.18 0.61 1.55 8.54 0.80
Case 5:  = 1;  = 0:2
ML0
ML01
ML02
ML03
11.91
10.02
21.06
14.15
DC0 1.98 1.72 2.51 7.50 0.37
DC01 1.55 1.00 1.77 3.71 0.63
DC02 2.29 1.41 3.91 8.76 0.58
DC03 1.32 0.63 1.87 2.48 0.82
Note: This table compares the results obtained by simulating the three models under the optimal policy (the DC0X models)
with the empirial (ML0X) models shown in the previous table. The welfare specications a¤ect the policy rules and hence
the volatilities of the goal variables. Optimization reduces the welfare loss relative to the empirical rules, with the percentage
welfare gains being shown in the nal column.
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Fig 1(a) Output gap volatility
(one step ahead estimate and 95% confidence interval)
!&
!%
!$
"
$
%
&
#('" #('$ #('% #('& #('' #((" #(($ #((% #((& #((' $""" $""$ $""% $""& $""' $"#"
Fig 1(b) Output shocks
(One step ahead error (x) and 95% confidence interval)
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Fig 2(a) Inflation volatility
(one step ahead estimate and 95% confidence interval)
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Fig 2(b) Inflation shocks
(One step ahead error (x) and 95% confidence interval)
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Fig 3(a) Base rate volatility
(one step ahead estimate and 95% confidence interval)
!'
!&
!%
!$
!#
"
#
$
%
&
'
#*)" #*)$ #*)& #*)( #*)) #**" #**$ #**& #**( #**) $""" $""$ $""& $""( $"") $"#"
Fig 3(b) Monetary policy (base rate) shocks
(One step ahead error (x) and 95% confidence interval)
0 20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
 g shock
g 
re
sp
o
n
se
0 20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
pi
 
re
sp
o
n
se
0 20 40
0
0.5
1
r 
re
sp
o
n
se
0 20 40
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
pi shock
0 20 40
0
0.5
1
 
 
0 20 40
0
0.5
1
0 20 40
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
r shock
0 20 40
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0 20 40
0
0.5
1
ML0 ML1 ML2 ML3
Fig 4. Impulse response functions for the ML models (response to one period shocks)
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Fig 5. Responses to a sequence (20-quarters) of positve and negative inflation shocks
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Fig 6. Impulse response functions for the DC0X models (response to one period shocks)
